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Abstract
We revisit Maxwell’s (1998) analysis to show that MQS regulation has no
eﬀects on the high-quality firm’s incentive to adopt a more eﬃcient tech-
nology in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with full market coverage and
convex costs of quality improvements which are independent of the scale of
production.
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1 Introduction
A relatively small literature investigates the relationship between the intro-
duction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically diﬀerentiated
industry and the high-quality firm’s incentive to invest in a new technology
characterised by a lower marginal cost (Maxwell, 1998; Garella, 2006).
Maxwell (1998), in particular, nests into a tradition dating back to Gab-
szewicz and Thisse (1979) to model the role of MQS regulation in a duopoly
where the market is fully covered by assumption and firms bear convex costs
of quality improvement which are unrelated to the scale of production. He
claims that (i) the unregulated equilibrium low-quality level is zero, and (ii)
the adoption of MQSs reduces the high-quality firm’s incentive to adopt a
more eﬃcient technology, ultimately involving a welfare loss. The aim of this
note is to show that this is not the case because
• full coverage does require a strictly positive low-quality level;
• for any level of the low quality which is compatible with full market
coverage, social welfare is decreasing; therefore, the MQS cannot bite;
• as a consequence, the MQS cannot exert any influence on the high-
quality firm’s incentive to adopt a more eﬃcient technology.
2 The model
We take into consideration the same model as in Maxwell (1998, p. 356). A
continuum of consumers of mass 1 is uniformly distributed over the interval
1
£
θ, θ
¤
with θ > 0 and density δ = 1/
¡
θ − θ
¢
.1 A generic consumer identified
by a marginal willingness to pay for quality θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
is characterised by the
indirect utility function U = θqi − pi if the consumer buys, U = 0 if he/she
does not. qi and pi are the quality and price of the product sold by firm i. The
market is supplied by two firms, H and L, that oﬀer vertically diﬀerentiated
products characterised by quality levels qH > qL. Firm i bears a cost function
that depends upon both output and quality, Ci = cxi + F (qi, η) , where xi
is the output level, c > 0 is a constant marginal cost common to both firms,
and η > 0 is a parameter rescaling the cost of quality improvement F (qi, η) .
As to the latter, which may be considered as the R&D component of total
costs, we assume:
F (0, η) = 0;
∂F (0, η)
∂qi
= 0;
∂F (qi, η)
∂qi
> 0;
∂F (qi, η)
∂η
< 0∀qi ≥ 0, η > 0. (1)
We assume that U = θqi − pi ≥ 0 for all θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
, i.e., the market is
fully covered. Therefore, the demand system is:
xH =
θ − bθ
θ − θ
; xL =
bθ − θ
θ − θ
(2)
where bθ = (pH − pL) / (qH − qL) identifies the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between purchasing qH and qL. Accordingly, firm i’s profit function is πi =
(pi − c)xi − F (qi, η) .
As usual, firms’ strategic interaction takes the form of a two-stage non-
cooperative game with simultaneous moves in each stage: in the first, firms
choose qualities, in the second they compete in prices. The solution concept
is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
1These two assumptions concerning the positivity of θ and the density measure are
absent in Maxwell’s paper but they are strictly needed.
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3 The game
For a generic quality pair, optimal prices are:
p∗H =
(qH − qL)
¡
2θ − θ
¢
3
+ c ; p∗L =
(qH − qL)
¡
θ − 2θ
¢
3
+ c. (3)
Note that the above prices determine the following demands:
xH =
2θ − θ
3
¡
θ − θ
¢ ; xL = θ − 2θ
3
¡
θ − θ
¢ (4)
which are independent of qualities. Therefore, upstream competition in qual-
ities only determines the size of the unit markup pi− c and the development
cost F (qi, η) , but does not aﬀect the distribution of consumers across firms.
Note that the demand system in (4) is indeed meaningful provided that all
consumers, and in particular those patronising the low-quality firm, enjoy
a non-negative surplus. This aspect of the model is bound to exert some
relevant bearings upon the remainder of the analysis. Moreover, from (4), it
appears that θ > 2θ is required in order to ensure xL > 0.
Using (3), we obtain the relevant profit functions at the quality stage:
πH =
(qH − qL)
¡
2θ − θ
¢2
9
¡
θ − θ
¢ −F (qH , η) ; πL = (qH − qL) ¡θ − 2θ¢2
9
¡
θ − θ
¢ −F (qL, η) .
(5)
The above expressions entail that the present game has the following crucial
property:
Lemma 1 Firms’ best reply functions at the quality stage are orthogonal.
Proof. Profit functions (5) are additively separable w.r.t. quality levels. As
a consequence,
∂2πi
∂qi∂qj
= 0, i 6= j. (6)
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This proves the Lemma.
Lemma 1 produces a relevant corollary:
Corollary 2 With full market coverage and fixed costs of quality improve-
ments, MQS regulation leaves unaﬀected the high-quality level.
This result is in contrast with the acquired wisdom whereby introducing
an MQS brings about an increase in all quality levels, given that qualities are
strategic complements, as, e.g., in Ronnen (1991). This can be attributed to
the full coverage assumption, which is the only substantive diﬀerence between
the present setup and Ronnen’s.
Now we turn to the first order conditions at the quality stage. While:
∂πH
∂qH
=
¡
2θ − θ
¢2
9
¡
θ − θ
¢ − ∂F (qH , η)
∂qH
= 0 (7)
has an internal solution, ∂πL/∂qL < 0 everywhere, as long as full coverage
holds. On this basis, Maxwell claims that q∗L = 0 (see his Proposition 1,
p. 357). However, this is inadmissible in that it would entail a negative
surplus for any consumer purchasing the low quality. This can be easily
ascertained by checking that p∗L > 0 from (3), while the gross surplus θqL =
0 in correspondence of qL = 0. As a consequence, this would violate the
assumption of full market coverage, since all those consumers accounting for
xL would be actually unwilling to buy.
In order to preserve full market coverage in absence of an economically
meaningful internal optimum for qL, firm L should supply at least the quality
that makes the consumer identified by θ exactly indiﬀerent between purchas-
4
ing or not, given p∗L :
θqL − p∗L ≥ 0∀ qL ≥
3c+ qH
¡
θ − 2θ
¢
θ + θ
∀qH (8)
where
3c+ qH
¡
θ − 2θ
¢
θ + θ
< qH (9)
provided that θqH > c and πL > 0. While the former condition is always
true as it amounts to saying that the poorest consumer in the market must
be able to buy the high quality at the marginal cost of a unit of output, the
latter may or may not hold depending on the relative size of c and η, given
θ > 2θ. Provided πL > 0, we are able to claim:
Lemma 3 The maximum level of πL compatible with full market coverage
attains at bqL = 3c+ qH ¡θ − 2θ¢
θ + θ
.
Proof. Straightforward, since ∂πL/∂qL < 0 for all qL ∈ [bqL, qH) .2
By Lemma 2 it is clear that if firm L were forced to guarantee market cov-
erage through the provision of a quality at least equal to qˆL, it would choose
exactly that level as long as profits are non-negative. The point thus is to ex-
amine whether a planner would like to regulate the market by setting a MQS
above qˆL. To make things more explicit, we follow Maxwell (1998, p. 357)
in assuming that F (qi, η) = q2i /η. If so, then q
∗
H =
¡
2θ − θ
¢2
η/
£
18
¡
θ − θ
¢¤
,
and bqL = 54c ¡θ − θ¢+ η ¡θ − 2θ¢ ¡2θ − θ¢2
18
¡
θ − θ
¢ ¡
θ + θ
¢ . (10)
2Note that, if πL < 0 in qL = bqL, firm L could not search for a lower quality level qL0
such that πL = 0, since ∂πL/∂qL < 0 implies that qL0 would be incompatible with full
coverage.
5
The desirability of a minimum quality standard can be approached in the
following terms. Define the social welfare function:
W = πL (p∗H , p
∗
L, q
∗
H) + πH (p
∗
H , p
∗
L, q
∗
H) + (11)
+
1
θ − θ
"Z bθ
θ
(zqL − p∗L) dz +
Z θ
bθ (zq
∗
H − p∗H) dz
#
.
The regulator directly influences qL, given {p∗H , p∗L, q∗H} .We first evaluate the
derivative:
∂W
∂qL
=
¡
θ − 2θ
¢ ¡
θ + 4θ
¢
18
¡
θ − θ
¢ − 2qL
η
(12)
at qL = bqL, yielding ∂W/∂qL|bqL ∝ −108c ¡θ − θ¢− ¡θ − 2θ¢2 ¡7θ + θ¢ η < 0.
Therefore, the regulator does not desire to increase quality, which amounts
to saying that an MQS would not bite. Moreover, and more important, this
also implies:
Proposition 4 MQS regulation with fixed costs of quality improvement is
incompatible with full market coverage.
By setting an MQS equal to the solution of (12), the regulator would
violate the assumption of full market coverage upon which prices (3), the
high-quality level q∗H and the social welfare function (11) are based. Dropping
the full coverage assumption would open a diﬀerent perspective where it is
known that a binding MQS would exist (Ronnen, 1991).
As long as we stick to the assumption of full market coverage, and given
that bqL is in fact not subject to MQS regulation, then there exists no direct
correlation between MQS regulation and the high-quality firm’s incentive to
adopt a new technology characterised by a higher η. With direct reference
6
to Maxwell’s analysis (1998, p. 357), eq. (10) never holds as qL = 0 is not
admissible, and consequently the eﬀect of a variation of η on firm H’s profits
is always assessed as in eq. (11).
4 Concluding remarks
Reassessing Maxwell’s (1998) analysis, we have shown that an MQS cannot
be binding under full market coverage and therefore cannot influence the
incentive to innovate by the high-quality firm. This conclusion raises a further
issue, which we leave for future research: under what conditions regarding
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality may the introduction of an MQS
induce a switch from full to partial coverage? This is a relevant question for
the optimal design of this regulatory instrument that, so far, has remained
neglected.
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